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Mens rea – Mistake of Law & Mistake of Fact in German
Criminal Law: A Survey for International Criminal Tribunals*
MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR**
“There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment
is the sequence of wickedness. Neither in philosophical speculation, nor in religious or
moral sentiment, would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty
unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principal of our legal system, as probably it is of
every other, that the essence of an offence is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot
exist.”
Joel Bishop, A Treatise on Criminal Law, 1865.
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1 In examining the issue of whether a standard of mens rea that is lower than ‘direct intent’
may apply in relation to “ordering” under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute the Appeals Chamber
of the Yugoslav Tribunal deems it useful to consider the approaches of national jurisdiction, see
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´ (Case No. IT-95-14-A), Judgment, 29 July 2004, paras. 34–42;
In order to facilitate a better understanding of the concept of complicity the Yugoslav Tribunal
refers to four national legal systems namely; the former Yugoslavia, France, Germany, and
England, see Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic´, Decision on Rule 98 bis Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal, 31 October 2002, paras. 54–59; In determining that duress is not a defence to a charge
of crimes against humanity and war crimes, the Yugoslav Tribunal considered in some detail the
authorities in customary international law, the post World WarII military tribunals, general prin-
ciples of law recognised by civilised nations, and the position in a variety of civil law and com-
mon law systems, see Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´, (Case No. IT-96-22-A), Judgment, 7 October
1997, paras. 40–61.
2 While the terminology utilised varies, these two elements have been described as “univer-
sal and persistent in mature systems of law”. See Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al., (Case No. IT-96-
21-T), Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 424 (also known as Cˇelebic´i), quoting Morissette
v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246.
3 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
4 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc.
S/RES/827; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955.
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (17 July,
1998), entered into force 1 July 2002, Art. 30 provides as follows:
Introduction
Even though international criminal law is an autonomous area of law and its
terms are to be construed accordingly, the proper interpretation and appropri-
ate application of international criminal law often requires a comparative
analysis of national legal systems. The two ad hoc Tribunals have consistently
referenced national approaches to a variety of legal issues to support their
ﬁndings on issues of both substantive and procedural international criminal
law.1 Among these issues was the identiﬁcation of the mens rea required for
triggering the criminal responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. It is a general principle of law that the establishment of crim-
inal culpability requires an analysis of both actus reus, the material element of
a crime, and mens rea, the mental element of a crime.2 The jurisprudence of the
Tribunals mirrors the difﬁculty of identifying the various forms and shades of
mens rea in international criminal law. One reason for this is the lack of a gen-
eral deﬁnition of the issue in either the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters,3 or the
Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals.4 As a result of the general uncertainty
regarding the deﬁnition of various categories of mens rea and the absence of
a customary rule regarding these issues, the drafters of the Rome Statute
decided to include a special provision on the subject.5 However, it is doubtful
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“1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for pun-
ishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are
committed with intent and knowledge. 2. For the purpose of this article, a person has intent
where: (a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In rela-
tion to a consequence, that person means to cause the consequence or is aware that it will
occur in the ordinary course of events. 3. For the purpose of this article, ‘knowledge’means
awareness that a circumstance exist or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.”
6 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal law, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003) 159–60. Professor Schabas noted that “article 30 of the Rome Statute is not only
confusing and ambiguous, it is also superﬂuous, and that judges of the International Criminal
Court, like their colleagues at the ICTY, would easily have understood the mental element of
crimes without them having to be told.” William A. Schabas, ‘Mens rea and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 37 New England Law Review (2003) 1015, 1024.
7 Cassese, International Criminal law, ibid.
8 See the thorough and systematic analysis of civil and common law jurisdictions with
regard to the mens rea required for recklessness or dolus eventualis as adopted by Blasˇkic´’s
Defence in Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, (Case No. IT-95-14-A), Appellant’s Appeal Brief, 14
January 2002, Section VIII, pp. 128–132 (on ﬁle with the author); In Jelisic´, the Ofﬁce of the
Prosecutor (OTP) argued that the concept of dolus specialis, which is a civil law term used to
describe the mens rea of a crime, set too high a standard, and could not be equated with the com-
mon law concepts of “speciﬁc intent” or “special intent”, as a consequence, the OTP undertaken
a comparative analysis with respect mens rea standards in both civil and common law systems,
Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Prosecution’s Appeal Brief (Redacted Version),
Section IV entitled “Mens rea Standards in Comparative Law”.
9 See Catherine Elliott, ‘The French Law of Intent and Its Inﬂuence on the Development of
International Criminal Law’, 11 Criminal Law Forum (2000) 35, 36–38.
that this provision, which is described in article 30 of the Rome Statute, ade-
quately covers all the signiﬁcant variations of subjective elements of interna-
tional crimes.6 As Professor Cassese suggests, coming to grips with the present
dilemma requires that one must start from the assumption that what matters 
is to identify the possible existence of general rules of international law or 
principles common to the major legal systems of the world.7 Both the Yugoslav
and Rwanda Tribunals have adopted this view. In determining the requisite
mens rea of international crimes, judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers of
the two ad hoc Tribunals often based their arguments on a comparison of the
world’s major criminal law systems and on a systematic analysis of the exist-
ing case law.8
It follows that different legal systems require different standards of mens rea.
Accordingly, what may occur is a breakdown in communication between dif-
ferent modes of legal analysis. French criminal system, for example, distin-
guishes two components of mens rea, “la conscience” and “la volonté”, both
of which are said to be required for both “general intent” and “special intent”.9
Similarly, German, Austrian and Swiss law also require two components for
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10 The Model Penal Code (MPC) limits the number of men rea terms to four: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. For a thorough analysis of the MPC see Paul H.
Robinson & Jane A. Grall, ‘Element Analysis in Deﬁning Criminal Liability: The Model Penal
Code and Beyond, 35 Stanford Law Review (1997) 681, 719–24. But for a critique view of the
Model Penal Code’s mens rea see Kenneth W. Simons, ‘Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens
rea Provisions be Amended’ 1Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2003) 179.
11 See for example the conclusion reached by Blasˇkic´ Appeals Chamber at para. 43 where it
“considers that none of the Trial Chamber . . . articulations of the mens rea for ‘ordering’ under
Article 7(1) of the Statute, in relation to a culpable mental state that is lower than direct intent,
is correct.” The Appeals Chamber emphasized that mere knowledge of risk does not sufﬁce for
the imposition of criminal responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, supra note 1, para. 41. For the erroneous interpretation of mens
rea standard for ‘ordering’adopted by Blasˇkic´ Trial Chamber see Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´,
(Case No. IT-95-14-T), Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras. 562, 592, 653, 738, and 741.
mens rea “wissen” and “wollen”. These two components form at least three 
different kinds of mens rea, in descending order of seriousness, absicht (inten-
tion in the strict sense), dolus indirectus (indirect intent) and bedingter vorsatz
(dolus eventualis) (conditional intent).
Common law systems, however, have their own baggage. Both the English
and United States criminal law recognize three basic mental attitudes which
constitute the core of the overarching concept of mens rea, namely: intention;
recklessness; and criminal negligence.10
More than a decade has passed since the establishment of the two ad hoc
Tribunals, however, the jurisprudence of both Tribunals evidence the incon-
sistency regarding the requisite mens rea standards for serious violations of
international humanitarian law.11
Hence, a survey of the attitude taken towards the deﬁnition of the major
facets of mens rea by the world major legal systems is of great signiﬁcance with
regard to the establishment of a uniﬁed concept for mens rea in international
criminal law.
The purpose of this study is to illustrate and discuss the mental elements of
criminal offences in German criminal law. Particularly, this study aims to
familiarize judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers coming from different
schools of law and seated at international criminal tribunals with such a fun-
damental concept in German criminal law.
Section I of this study will examine some of the major judgments of the two
ad hoc Tribunals where both Tribunals refers to national jurisdictions in order
to clarify the mens rea required for the imposition of criminal responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Section II is a brief out-
line of the structure of the criminal offence in German criminal law. This is nec-
essary since German criminal law does not follow the “offence analysis”
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12 Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute, ‘Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’ reads as
follows:
“The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Conventions:
(a) wilful killing; [ . . .]”
13 See Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al. (Case No. IT-96-21-T), Prosecutor’s Response to the Pre-
Trial Briefs of the Accused, 14 April 1997, Section 5 ‘Mens rea’, (on ﬁle with the author).
scheme known in common law countries, but is based upon a three stage struc-
ture of the criminal offence. In Section III, the concept of intention (Vorsatz)
in German criminal law is thoroughly discussed and analysed. This includes
the discussion of dolus directus (ﬁrst and second degree) as well as of dolus
eventualis. Emphasis is put on the differentiation between dolus eventualis and
negligence, since it reﬂects a highly debated issue in German criminal law. The
concept of negligence will be outlined in Section IV.
Given the fact that the German criminal law recognizes that mistake of law
and mistake of fact (Tatbestandsirrtum, Verbotsirrtum) is not a separate 
doctrine, but part and parcel of the basic analysis of mens rea, these two 
basic types of mistake will be addressed in Section V. This includes the dis-
cussion of error in persona vel obiecto and aberratio ictus. Finally, the con-
clusion will be supported by some remarks and recommendations regarding the
German law of intent and its inﬂuence on the development of international
criminal law.
I. Mens rea standards under the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc
Tribunals
A. Wilfulness as a starting point
As a starting point of the discussion, and due to the lack of a ‘mental element’
provision in the Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals, it seems appropriate to
look at offences provided for in these Statutes which in their language contain
a ‘mental element’.12 In Cˇelebic´i, the Prosecution’s position was that the mens
rea element of “wilful killing” and “murder” as provided for in article 2(a) of
the ICTY Statute is established where the accused possessed: (a) the intent to
kill, or (b) inﬂict grievous bodily harm on the victim. The Prosecution argues
that the word “wilful” must be interpreted to incorporate reckless acts as well
as a speciﬁc desire to kill, whilst excluding mere negligence.13 More particu-
larly, the Prosecution contends that, while the accused’s acts must be “inten-
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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law,
(Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) 290–91. In support of this argument, the
Prosecution relies on the Commentary to article 85 of Additional Protocol I which deﬁnes ‘wil-
fully’ in the following terms:
“the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on the act and
its consequences, and willing them (‘criminal intent’or ‘malice aforethought’); this encom-
passes concepts of ‘wrongful intent’ or ‘recklessness’, viz., the attitude of an agent who,
without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; on the
other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when a man acts
without having his mind on the act or its consequences.”
See Claude Pilloud, Jean De Preux, Yves Sandos et al., Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) Art. 85 of the
Additional Protocol 1.
17 Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al., supra note 2, para. 427.
tional”, the concept of intention can assume different forms, including both
“direct” and “indirect intention” to commit the unlawful act.14 Such “indirect
intention” incorporates the situation where the accused commits acts and 
is reckless to their consequences and where death is foreseeable.15 The
Prosecution argued that these various forms of intention are not all deﬁned
identically in national criminal systems, and it relies on a statement by
Professor Cherif Bassiouni:
“The customary practise of states, evidenced by international and national
military prosecutions, reveals that murder is not intended to mean only
those speciﬁc intentional killings without lawful justiﬁcation. Instead,
state practice views murder in its largo sensu meaning as including the 
creation of life endangering conditions likely to result in death according
to reasonable human experience. This standard was used in war related
cases involving mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilians. Notwith-
standing the technical differences in the deﬁnitions of various forms of
intentional and unintentional killing in the world’s major criminal justice
systems, the widespread common understanding of the meaning of mur-
der includes life-endangering conditions likely to result in death accord-
ing to the known and foreseeable expectations of a reasonable person in the
same circumstances.”16
Adopting a narrower deﬁnition of intent, the Defence argues that the mens rea
element of the offence of “wilful killing” requires a showing by the Prosecution
that the accused had the “speciﬁc intent” to cause death by his actions.17 The
Defence submits that the words “reckless” and “intent” are mutually exclusive,
and that “in the common law tradition offences requiring intent are typically
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18 Ibid. In this regard, the Defence cites the English case of R v. Sheppard [1981] AC 394 HL,
and quotes the statement made by Lord Diplock therein, that “[t]he primary meaning of ‘wil-
fully’ is ‘deliberate’” R v. Sheppard [1981] AC 394 HL, p. 418.
19 Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al., supra note 2, para. 431.
20 Ibid., para. 434.
21 R v. Crabbe (1985) 58 ALR 417. Cf. the previous view that the possibility of death or griev-
ous bodily harm might be sufﬁcient, Pemble v. the Queen, (1971) 124 CLR 107.
to be distinguished from those where mere recklessness will sufﬁce.”18 This,
in the view of the Defence, is the preferable construction of the mens rea
requirement for wilful killing or murder under the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I.
This semantic approach for the mens rea concept adopted by both the
Prosecution and the Defence was criticized by the Cˇelebic´i Trial Chamber:
“A simple semantic approach, or one which conﬁnes itself to the
speciﬁcities of particular national jurisdictions, can only lead to confusion
or a fruitless search for an elusive commonality. In any national legal sys-
tem, terms are utilised in a speciﬁc legal context and are attributed their
own speciﬁc connotations by the jurisprudence of that system. Such con-
notations may not necessarily be relevant when these terms are applied in
an international jurisdiction.”19
Notwithstanding the above statement, the Cˇelebic´i Trial Chamber examined
the scope of the term “wilful killing” and its relationship to “murder” by
analysing different approaches of national jurisdictions:
“At common law, the term ‘malice’ is often utilised to describe the neces-
sary additional element that transforms a homicide from a case of
‘manslaughter’ to one of ‘murder’. Yet again, however, there is a strong
danger of confusion if such terminology is transposed into the context of
international law, without explanation of its exact meaning. ‘Malice’does
not merely refer to ‘ill-will’on the part of the perpetrator of the killing, but
extends to his intention to cause great bodily harm or to kill without legal
justiﬁcation or excuse and also denotes a wicked and corrupt disregard of
the lives and safety of others. In most common law jurisdictions, the mens
rea requirement of murder is satisﬁed where the accused is aware of the
likelihood or probability of causing death or is reckless as to the causing
of death.”20
The Trial Chamber went further examining the requisite mens rea of murder
in different common law countries:
“In Australia, . . . knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm will 
probably result from the actions of the accused is the requisite test.21
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22 Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, Art. 229.
23 Criminal Code, s. 300.
24 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983)
123–24.
25 Explosive Substances Act 1883 s. 4.
26 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, supra note 24, (footnotes omitted).
27 Cassese, International Criminal law, supra note 6, p. 164.
Under Canadian law, the accused is required to have a simultaneous
awareness of the probability of death and the intention to inﬂict some form
of serious harm,22 and this is also the position in Pakistan.23”
Most notably, “knowledge” which is not a notion familiar to civil law coun-
tries, is considered by some of the common law countries like the UK as hav-
ing the same value and intensity as intent. To put it differently, a statute may
require knowledge by requiring intention, but it may also require knowledge
by explicitly employing that word, or one of its grammatical variants.24 The
offence of knowingly possessing explosives is an example of an express
requirement of knowledge.25 Professor Glanville Williams observed that in
such legislation, the requirement of knowledge is generally interpreted as
applying to all the circumstances of the offence, unless the statute makes the
contrary meaning plain.26 Hence, and as remarkably observed by Professor
Cassese, in some common law countries, “Knowledge” denotes two different
forms of mental states, depending on the contents of the substantive penal rule
at stake:
“(i) if the substantive penal rule prescribes the existence of a particular fact
or circumstance for the crime to materialize, knowledge means awareness
of the existence of this fact or circumstance; (ii) if instead the substantive
criminal rule focuses on the result of one’s conduct, then knowledge
means (a) awareness that one’s actions is most likely to bring about the
harmful result, and nevertheless (b) taking the high risk of causing that
result.”27
Once again, the Cˇelebic´i Trial Chamber continued its survey regarding a
uniﬁed deﬁnition for the requisite mens rea of murder by referring to civil law
countries:
“The civil law concept of dolus describes the voluntariness of an act and
incorporates both direct and indirect intention. Under the theory of indi-
rect intention (dolus eventualis), should an accused engage in life-endan-
gering behaviour, his killing is deemed intentional if he “makes peace”
with the likelihood of death. In many civil law jurisdictions the foresee-
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28 See Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al., supra note 2, para. 435. In this case the Trial Chamber made
references to the commentary on criminal codes related to civil law countries namely: Belgium,
Germany, and Italy.
29 In determining the meaning of the terms utilised in the ICTY Statute the Trial Chamber fol-
lowed Fletcher analysis: “the method of analysing ordinary usage invites us to consider what
these terms mean as they are used, not what they mean when wrenched out of context and
deﬁned for the purposes of legal analysis.” See George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978) 451.
30 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 498
(English Translation). However, the same Trial Chamber in para. 520 contradict itself by adopt-
ing a different standard of the mens rea of genocide: “[w]ith regard to the crime of genocide, the
offender is culpable only when he has committed one of the offences charged under Article 2(2)
of the Statute with the clear intent to destroy . . . a particular group. The offender is culpable
because he knew or should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part,
a group.”
31 The Akayesu Trial Chamber cited the following publications: F. Desportes and F. Le
Gunehec, Le Nouveau Droit Pénal, Tome 1, Droit pénal général, 3rd ed. (1996), 364; M.L.
Rassat, Droit pénal général, 2nd edition (1999), 353, who speciﬁcally distinguishes between “dol
spécial” and “l’exigence d’un but particulier” (the requirement of a particular goal); C. Elliot,
‘The French Law of Intent and Its Inﬂuence on the Development of International Criminal Law’,
ability of death is relevant and the possibility that death will occur is gen-
erally sufﬁcient to fulﬁl the requisite intention to kill.”28
Finally, the Trial Chamber analysed the term ‘wilful’ and reached the conclu-
sion that it is a form of intent that includes ‘recklessness’as understood in com-
mon law jurisdictions but excludes ordinary negligence.29 Yet, recklessness or
dolus eventualis are sufﬁcient mens rea standards to trigger the criminal
responsibility for murder or wilful killing as provided for in the Geneva
Conventions and Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute.
B. Speciﬁc intent or dolus specialis
International rules may require a special intent (dolus specialis, dol aggravé)
for particular classes of crimes. One understanding of special intent is related
to the degree or intensity of the requisite mens rea. This sense is given to the
term by the Akayesu Trial Judgment: “Speciﬁc intention, required as a con-
structive element of a crime, . . . demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to
produce the act charged.”30 The Akayesu Trial Chamber evidently assigned a
higher degree of mens rea to the term than mere knowledge. However, the term
dol spécial, which was used by the Trial Chamber in the original French pas-
sage in Akayesu and to which all-subsequent decisions refer, is not unam-
biguous under French law. To the majority of scholars, it appears to mean
“l’intention d’atteindre un certain résultat prohibé par la loi pénale”, i.e. the
intention to achieve a certain result prohibited by law.31 Speciﬁc intent can thus
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11 Criminal Law Reform (2000) 35, 41. Elliot assigns to dol special the meaning of intent
towards the result of the act and deﬁnes additional aims as dol aggravé.
32 For more on dolus directus of the ﬁrst degree see section III (A) of the present study.
33 Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Prosecution’s Appeal Brief (Public Redacted
Version), para. 4.22; See also Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., (Case No. IT-95-8-I) Judgement on
Defence Motions to Acquit, 3 September 2001, para. 142.
34 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Judgement, 5 July 2001, para. 51.
35 Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, supra note 33, 
para. 60.
be equalled with the common law term of purpose or the civil law concept of
dolus directus in the ﬁrst degree (Absicht).32
In the Jelisic Appeal, the Prosecution argued that the concept of dolus spe-
cialis, which is a civil law term used to describe the mens rea of a crime, set
too high a standard, and could not be equated with the common law concepts
of “speciﬁc intent” or “special intent.”33 The Appeals Chamber dealt with the
matter rather laconically, saying simply that the Trial Chamber had used the
term dolus specialis as if it meant “speciﬁc intent.” The Appeals Chamber
referred to “speciﬁc intent” to describe “the intent to destroy in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” or, in other words, the
normative requirement set out in the chapeau of the deﬁnition of genocide.34
In Sikirica, the Trial Chamber criticised the Prosecutor for introducing a debate
about theories of intent for the crime of genocide, noting that the matter should
be resolved with reference to the text of the provision:
“The ﬁrst rule of interpretation is to give words their ordinary meaning
where the text is clear. Here, the meaning of intent is made plain in the cha-
peau to Article 4(2). Beyond saying that the very speciﬁc intent required
must be established, particularly in the light of the potential for confusion
between genocide and persecution, the Chamber does not consider it nec-
essary to indulge in the exercise of choosing one of the three standards
identiﬁed by the Prosecution. In the light, therefore, of the explanation that
the provision itself gives as to the speciﬁc meaning of intent, it is unnec-
essary to have recourse to theories of intent.”35
It is very difﬁcult, however, to say which meaning the two ad hoc Tribunals
assign to the term. It seems from the case law that the ICTR has been inclined
to favour the ﬁrst approach and have given the term an intensity-related thrust.
As ICTR judgments speciﬁcally used the term dol spécial, and since ICTR
jurisprudence generally appears to be strongly inﬂuenced by civil law and
French law in particular, it might be argued that they intended to give it the
same meaning as (the majority) under French law (the intention to achieve a
certain result prohibited by law). The jurisprudence of the ICTY is less clear.
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36 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgement, supra note 34, paras. 43, 51.
37 Ibid., paras. 45, footnote 81.
38 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, (Case No. ICTY-IT-98-33), Judgment, Aug. 2, 2001, 
para. 571.
39 The term “surplus of intent” was ﬁrst used by the Yugoslav Trial Chamber in Prosecutor
v. Milomir Stakic, (Case No. IT-97-24-T), Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 520.
40 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, (Case No. IT-95-14-A), Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, 14
January 2002, p.130. Reference has been made by the Appellant with regard to para. 278 of the
Judgment rendered by Blasˇkic´ Trial Chamber.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., pp. 130–132.
In Jelesic´, the Appeals Chamber seems to have adopted the view that the term
(speciﬁc intent) or dolus Specialis does not imply any higher degree of the req-
uisite intent as such.36 It asserts that it only used the term to refer to “genoci-
dal intent” and did not attribute to it as requiring that the perpetrator seeks to
achieve the destruction.37 The Jelesic´ Appeals Chamber applied the deﬁnition
adopted in Akayesu and on the face of it equalled “speciﬁc intent” with pur-
pose. The same approach was taken by the Trial Chamber in Krstic´.38
Thus, it is submitted that, for the sake of consistency, the term “speciﬁc
intent” should be used as signifying “purpose”. The common law concept
“speciﬁc intent” should be referred to as “ulterior intent” or “surplus intent”.39
C. Recklessness or dolus eventualis
As far as recklessness is concerned, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has
recently discussed and analysed the exact contents of the concept. In Blaskic´,
the Appellant submitted that the Trial Chamber in deﬁning the mens rea 
standard required for a conviction for planning, instigating, and ordering,
erroneously adopted an “indirect intent” standard.40 The Appellant contended
that “indirect intent,” for the Trial Chamber, appeared to be synonymous 
with the common law concept of recklessness and/or the civil law concept of
dolus eventualis.41 In order to sustain its arguments, the Appellant undertook
a thorough analysis of both Common and Civil law jurisdictions with regard
to this issue.42
Facing the Appellant’s systematic analysis, the Appeals Chamber deemed it
useful to consider the approaches of national jurisdictions in order to adopt the
requisite mens rea for ‘ordering’ as provided for in article 7(1) of the ICTY
Statute:
“In common law systems, the mens rea of recklessness is sufﬁcient to
ground liability for serious crimes such as murder or manslaughter . . .
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43 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, para. 34. The Appeals
Chamber referred to the deﬁnition of recklessness as provided for in the Model Penal Code: “a
conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustiﬁable risk that the material element exists or will
result from [the actor’s] conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, consider-
ing the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its dis-
regard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation.” However, it is to be noted that the requirement that the defen-
dant “consciously disregard a substantial and unjustiﬁable risk” under the MPC is ambiguous.
The MPC recognizes a reckless actor as a person who must be aware of “substantial and
unjustiﬁable” risk; are these conjunctive or disjunctive requirements? What type or degree of
consciousness is required? Of what, precisely, must the actor be aware? For a critique opinion
on “recklessness as deﬁned in the MPC see Kenneth Simons, ‘Should the Model Penal Code’s
Mens rea Provision be Amended’, supra note 10, p. 179.
44 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Appeals Judgment, supra note 1, para. 38.
45 Ibid., para. 39.
46 Ibid.
According to the Model Penal Code . . . the degree of risk involved must
be substantial and unjustiﬁable; a mere possibility of risk is not enough.”43
Examining some of the major common law jurisdictions the Appeals Chamber
concluded that the adequate mens rea of recklessness required (1) the aware-
ness of a risk that the result or consequence will occur or will probably occur,
and (2) the risk must be unjustiﬁable or unreasonable. Mere possibility of a risk
that a crime or crimes will occur as a result of the actor’s conduct generally
does not sufﬁce to trigger criminal responsibility.44
The Appeals Chamber went further examining the concept of dolus eventu-
alis in Civil law systems, ﬁnding that this standard of intent may constitute the
requisite mens rea for serious crimes. In French law, this concept has been char-
acterized as taking of a risk and the acceptance of the eventuality that harm may
result, even though the harm in question was not desired by the accused.45 The
Appeals Chamber went on to examine the concept in other civil law countries:
“In Italian law, the principle is expressed as follows: the occurrence of the
fact constituting a crime, even though it is not desired by the perpetrator,
is foreseen and accepted as a possible consequence of his own conduct.
The German Federal Supreme Court . . . has found that acting with dolus
eventualis requires that the perpetrator perceive the occurrence of the
criminal result as possible and not completely remote, and that he endorse
it or at least come to terms with it for the sake of the desired goal. It has
further stated that in the case of extremely dangerous, violent acts, it is
obvious that the perpetrator takes into account the possibility of the vic-
tim’s death and, since he continues to carry out the act, accepts such a
result. The volitional element denotes the borderline between dolus even-
tualis and advertent or conscious negligence.”46
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47 Ibid., para. 41.
48 See Section III(C)(1) of the present study. For a Common law perspective see Alan C.
Michaels, ‘Acceptance: The Missing Mental State’, 71 Southern California Law Review (1998)
953.
49 “Voluntative” is not a term in English usage and translation seems to be difﬁcult, but the
German concepts (wissen and wollen) seems at least to close to “awareness” and “desire”. See
Roger S. Clark, ‘The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences’, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2002)
291, 302.
Having examined the approaches of national systems as well as International
Tribunal precedents, the Appeals Chamber considered mere knowledge of 
any kind of risk, does not sufﬁce for the imposition of criminal responsibility
for serious violations of international humanitarian law. To put it differently,
an awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element must be
incorporated in the legal standard.47 Finally, the Appeals Chamber in para. 42
concluded:
“A person who orders an act or omission with the awareness of the sub-
stantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that
order, has the requisite mens rea for establishing liability under Article 7(1)
pursuant to ordering. Ordering with such awareness has to be regarded as
accepting that crime.”
These wordings of the Appeals Chamber coincide with the “consent and
approval theory” as recognized by both German literature and jurisprudence.48
However, the question of the immediacy of the risk, the degree of foresight or
the assessment of the probability of the risk remains to be resolved.
Having examined the attitude followed by the two ad hoc Tribunals in
deﬁning the various degrees of mens rea in comparative law. The following
sections will be an attempt to elaborate on the concepts of mental element in
German criminal law.
II. The German concept of crime
German criminal law, similar to most civil law systems recognizes intent as
being made up by two separate components: “wissen” and “wollen”, an
“intellektuelle komponente” and a “voluntative komponente”.49 Moreover,
German criminal law distinguishes between intention in the broad sense
(Vorsatz) and negligence (Fahrlässigkeit). It is difﬁcult, however, to ﬁnd a
notion of mens rea in German criminal law as it is known in common law coun-
tries. The reason is that, subjective elements are not integrated in a uniﬁed con-
cept of mens rea, but are discussed separately.
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50 See in general Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil (German Criminal Law:
The General Part), (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, vol. 1, 2001) 3–25.
51 Tatbestand is the shortened form of the German legal term Straftatbestand which means
the sum of legal elements constituting the criminal offence in question.
52 These three-stage structures of the criminal offence in German Criminal Law were ﬁrstly
proposed by Franz von Liszt in his classical Lehrbuch of 1881. Liszt suggested a three-sectional
concept of a crime: ﬁrst there had to be an act, second that this act must be unlawful, and ﬁnally
that the unlawful act must be characterized as culpable. The same idea was developed by Ernst
Beling, (Die Lehre vom Verbrechen, 1906; Die Lehre vom Tatbestand, 1930). According to Liszt
and Beling, the criterion for differentiating between unlawfulness and mens rea was the purely
formal separation of the objective and the subjective elements of the criminal act. See also Hans-
Heinrich Jescheck, ‘The Doctrine of Mens rea in German Criminal Law: Its Historical
Background and Present Statute’, 8 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern
Africa (1975) 112, 114–15.
53 Werner F. Ebke and Matthew W. Finkin, Introduction to German Law, (The Hague, London
and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 387. For further analysis with regard to the three
stage structure of criminal offence, see Naucke, ‘An Insider’s Perspective on the Signiﬁcance
of German Criminal Theory’s General System for Analyzing Criminal Acts’, Brigham Young
University Law Review (1984) 305.
54 Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 50, p. 9.
55 It is to be noted that every provision of the Special Part (Besonderer Teil) of the StGB has
to be read in conjunction with the General Part (Allegemeiner Teil) of the StGB.
In German criminal law, the mens rea concept cannot be explained properly
without regard to the three stage structures of criminal offence.50 German
criminal law strictly differentiates between three stages of valuation of a crim-
inal offence, namely: Tatbestand (the legal elements of the offence);51
Rechtswidrigkeit (unlawfulness/wrongfulness/illegality); and Schuld (culpa-
bility).52 Accordingly, and in order to be punishable, a given conduct must fulﬁl
the legal elements of an offence (Tatbestand); be unlawful (Rechtswidrigkeit),
and there must be guilt on the part of the defendant (Schuld).53
A. Tatbestand or the legal elements of the offence
The ﬁrst stage Tatbestand or the legal elements of the offence encompasses
both the objective and the subjective elements of the offence. Yet, a defendant
fulﬁls the legal elements of a criminal offence if his conduct corresponds with
the statutory deﬁnition of an act prohibited by the StGB (Criminal Code).54 For
instance, section 212 of the StGB (regarding manslaughter) stipulates that
“[w]hoever intentionally kills another human being [. . .], or section 223 of the
StGB ( regarding bodily injury) “[w]hoever physically mistreats or injures the
health of another person intentionally [. . .].”55 At this stage, it is to be evalu-
ated whether or not both the objective and the subjective legal elements of a
criminal offence prohibited by a statutory provision of the StGB are fulﬁlled.
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56 It is to be noted that Vorsatz in the broad sense is the generic term for different types of men-
tal status, namely, Absicht or dolus directus ﬁrst degree; dolus directus second degree; and dolus
eventualis. Vorsatz translates roughly to intent, but in order to avoid any misunderstanding of
that word and other key mental state deﬁnitions with Common law doctrine, it is desirable to
leave the German legal terms such as “Absicht” and “Vorsatz” as they stand in their ordinary lan-
guage without being translated into the English language.
57 The main focus of this study is to discuss the mens rea concept in German criminal law and
not the objective elements or the actus reus (Der objektive Tatbestand) of the crime, however,
the objective elements of a crime can be deﬁned as a components of the following elements: 
(1) act; (2) circumstances; (3) consequences. For more details on the objective element of crime
in the German criminal law see Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, Teil 
II, (German Criminal Law The General Part, vol. II), Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003,  pp. 27–101;
Ebke and Finkin, Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, pp. 387–8; Theodor Lenckner, in:
Schönke and Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, (München: Beck’sche Verlagsbuch-
handlung, 2001)165.
58 Volker Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, ibid., at 11.
59 Paul K. Ryu, ‘Discussion of Structure and Theory’, 24 The American Journal of
Comparative Law (1976) 602, 607.
Most notably, the subjective elements of Tatbestand comprise (1) Vorsatz
(intent in a broad sense)56 and (2) “further mental elements” (“besondere sub-
jektive Tatbestandsmerkmale”). Each of these subjective elements will be
examined and discussed in detail.57
B. Rechtswidrigkeit or (unlawfulness/wrongfulness/illegality)
The second stage Rechtswidrigkeit or unlawfulness is an inquiry to ascertain
the presence of any grounds of legal justiﬁcation. Another way of putting the
point is to ask: do grounds of legal justiﬁcation intervene? If this question is
answered in the negative, the act is proved to be unlawful. If the answer is in
the afﬁrmative, the act is considered as lawful despite its fulﬁlment of the
Tatbestand.58 This concept of ‘illegality’ is useful since it requires analysis of
conduct suspected to be criminal (as long as the conduct in question satisﬁes
the requirement of statutory actus reus and mens rea) from the standpoint 
of its potential ‘legality’. Thus, an ofﬁcial executioner satisﬁes the above 
mentioned requirements of murder (the objective and subjective elements) 
yet is exempt from punishment because his conduct is not ‘illegal’.59 Most
notably, Tatbestand (the fulﬁlment of the legal elements of the offence) and
Rechtswidrigkeit (the unlawfulness of the act) have to be distinguished; both
are different stages of valuation within the three stage structure of criminal
offences. This unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) is not part of the objective 
elements of the offence and as a consequence, there is no need for mens rea
evaluation at the present stage. Hence, the defendant could not claim that he
lacks knowledge of unlawfulness (consciousness of the wrongful character 
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60 Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 137.
61 Ibid. For more details regarding mistake of fact and mistake of law see section V of the
present study.
62 Johannes Wessels & Werner Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (Heidelberg: Müller
Verlag, 2002) 125.
63 Ibid.
64 Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 13; Jescheck &
Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil, (1996) at 423; Theodor Lenckner, in Adolf
Schönke & Horst Schröder (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar (München: Beck’sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1997) 192.
65 Ibid.
66 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 125.
67 See Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil, (Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot 1996), § 38 I, at 407; for critical remarks see Lenckner, in: Schönke/Schröder,
Strafgesetzbuch. Kommentar, supra note 57, p. 195; Wessels & Beulke, § 10, at 137.
68 Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 13.
of the act).60 Thus, error iuris (the error as to the prohibited nature of the act),
does not affect the perpetrator’s intent.61 According to German criminal law
system, the above two stages, namely, Tatbestand and Rechtswidrigkeit con-
stitute the criminal wrong (Unrecht). Hence, if the requirements of these two
stages are fulﬁlled, an act is considered illegal. The defendant, however, can-
not be held criminally liable for such an act, unless culpability (Schuld) is
proven on his part.62
C. Schuld or (culpability)
At the Schuld stage (guilt or culpability stage), it is to be questioned whether
the defendant can be blamed or personally reproached with the conduct “die
Frage, ob dem Täter die rechtswidrige tat persönlich vorzuwerfen ist”.63 That
is to say intentional conduct is not more than an indication for the culpability
of an offender. It is not a matter of responsibility for one’s immoral conduct or
evil character, but a matter of guilt for the individual act (Einzeltatschuld).64
Thus, there could be criminal wrong without culpability, but no culpability
could be proven without fulﬁlment of the legal elements of the criminal offence
“Auch stehen Unrecht und Schuld nicht beziehungslos nebeneinander, denn es
gibt zwar Unrecht ohne Schulde, nicht aber umgekehrt strafrechtliche Schuld
ohne kriminelles Unrecht.”65 Another way of putting the point is, even if it is
proved that the defendant acted intentionally vorsätzlich culpability still has to
be proved on his part.66
Strictly speaking, in German criminal law culpability requires blame-
worthiness on the part of the offender.67 This blameworthiness required that 
the defendant could have avoided the criminal offence at hand.68 This was the
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69 BGH St 2, 194 200 (GS) quoted and translated by Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner
Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 15.
70 Paul Ryu, ‘Discussion of Structure and Theory’, supra note 59, at 608.
71 Ibid.
72 BGHSt 2, 194 (201) (Bundesgerichtshof = Federal Supreme Court; ofﬁcial collection of
judgments, vol. 2, p. 194 at p. 201).
73 In case of negligence, culpability in the form of negligence (Fahrlaessigkeitsschuld) has
to be proved on the part of the accused.
74 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 46–8.
75 Jerome Hall, ‘The New German Penal Code: Comment on Structure and Theory’, 24 
The American Journal of Comparative Law (1976) 615, 618.
view adopted by the Federal Supreme Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof –
BGH):
“Punishment requires culpability. Culpability means blameworthiness
(Schuld ist Vorwerfbarkeit). The dishonourable condemnation of culpa-
bility denotes that the perpetrator is reproached with having acted unlaw-
fully . . . although he could have acted lawfully, i.e. he could have decided
in favour of the law”.69
Hence, within the context of Schuld, “intent has a connotation distinctive
from that within the context of the actus reus or Tatbestand, where it ﬁgures
as its steering factor.”70 At this stage, intent includes a consciousness of “sur-
rounding circumstances” (begleitende Umstände), the various factors that
give each concrete criminal act its distinctive mark.71
Yet, one might deduce that since culpability requires blameworthiness,72
mere intention with reference to the conduct is not sufﬁcient to trigger the crim-
inal culpability for intentional offences. That is to say, Vorsatzschuld is not just
the intention to kill or to harm, etc.; it also includes blameworthiness or knowl-
edge that the conduct is illegal. Thus, it has to be proved that the offender was
capable of gaining insight into the unlawfulness of his conduct and was capa-
ble of behaving in accordance with this insight. Accordingly, the corresponding
culpability in the form of intent (Vorsatzschuld ) has to be proved.73 Thus,
Vorsatzschuld is considered the corresponding mental element of culpability
(in case of intentional wrongdoing).74
To the extent that the defendant must actually know he is acting in an
immoral way, this statement is certainly questionable. From a common law
perspective, if the above statement means that in addition to intention there
must be blame, and blame in the sense of actual knowledge of wrong is
excluded, what does the statement mean?75 Jerome Hall an eminent common
law commentator had this to say:
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77 Most notably, in 1924, Edmund Mezger suggested that the objective and material content
of unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) couldn’t be deﬁned independently of the mental state of the
offender. For more on the theory of the subjective element of unlawfulness see Jescheck, ‘The
Doctrine of Mens rea in German Criminal Law: Its Historical Background and Present Statute’,
supra note 52, p. 116.
78 See Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung:
Muenchen 1997) 257. Formerly, however, Vorsatz has been considered to be a legal element 
of culpability (Schuld) only and has been discussed exclusively at this third stage. For different
theories see Wessels and Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 44.
79 See § 15 dStGB. Most notably Vorsatz can also be interpreted in conjunction with §§ 16,
17 dStGB; see Cramer & Sternberg-Lieben, in Schönke & Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch:
Kommentar, (Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung: Muenchen, 2001) 244, 247.
80 Fahrlässigkeit translates very roughly as negligence, but unlike the Model Penal Code neg-
ligence, it also includes some cases in which the defendant is aware of the risk.
81 RGSt 51, 305, 311; 58, 247 (Ofﬁcial Collection of the Judgments of the Reichsgericht
‘Court of the Reich’).
82 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 71.
Plainly, if one knows only that a certain act was intentional, he is in no
position to make any judgment of blame; to do that, one must ﬁnd the
defendant guilty of causing a proscribed harm and, also, exclude the doc-
trines of excuse and justiﬁcation.76
The foregoing analysis of the three-stage structures of the criminal offence
reveal that in the German criminal law system, the state of mind of the defen-
dant has to be evaluated mainly at two stages, namely, Tatbestand and Schuld.77
Therefore, the mental elements of criminal wrong have to be distinguished
from elements of culpability. This is the prevailing opinion nowadays.78
The following section will discuss in depth different categories of the sub-
jective elements of the intentional offences (Vorsatz or dolus) namely: intent
in the strict sense (Absicht); indirect intent( dolus indirectus); and (c) condi-
tional intent (dolus eventualis orBedingter Vorsatz).
III. Vorsatz or dolus in German criminal law
As mentioned above, under German criminal law, all offences can only be
committed with intention “Vorsatz”, unless the law expressly threatens negli-
gent acts with punishment.79 Similar to most of the civil/continental law coun-
tries, StGB does not deﬁne Vorsatz nor does it give a deﬁnition for negligence
(Fahrlässigkeit).80 The “Reichsgericht” (Court of the Reich), however, coined
the short formula saying that “Vorsatz ist Wissen und Wollen” (intention is
knowledge and wilfulness).81 This general guideline on the meaning of Vorsatz
is still valid nowadays, though sometimes criticized as “inexact”.82
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gesetzbuch (München: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1991) 87; Claus Roxin, 1 Strafrecht
Allgemeiner Teil, (Muenchen: Beck’sche, 1997) 364; Peter Cramer, ‘Vorsätzliches und
Fahrlässiges Handlen’, in Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar
(München: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1997) 248.
84 Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 109.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Knowledge of the objective element of the criminal offence has to be prior to or contem-
poraneous with the carrying out of the criminal offence. In case the perpetrator gained knowl-
edge about the relevant legal elements after having committed the criminal offence, (dolus
subsequence) he is not criminally liable.
88 The ﬁrst two forms of Vorsatz are roughly equivalent to the Model Penal Code concepts
of purpose and knowledge. See Michaels, ‘Acceptance: The Missing Mental State’, supra note
48, at 1025. For further details on the mens rea concept under the Model Penal Code see Wayne
R. La Fave and Austin W. Scott, 1 Substantive Criminal Law, (U.S.A.: West Law Publishing,
1986) 296–340.
89 Steffen Wirth, ‘Germany’s New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court’, 
1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 151, 155.
Generally speaking Vorsatz consists of two components: wissen andwollen.
The former is the cognitive component, while the latter presents the volitional
component.83 Vorsatz requires present and real knowledge (wissen) of the
physical legal elements of the offence on the part of the perpetrator; mere
potential knowledge is not sufﬁcient.84 That is not to say, that the perpetrator
has to make conscious reﬂections about the physical legal elements of the
offence, co-consciousness is sufﬁcient.85 This co-consciousness may be pres-
ent in two forms, (1) co-consciousness based on awareness, and (2) co-con-
sciousness based on the knowledge of the accompanying circumstances.86
Yet, wissen requires that the perpetrator at the time of committing the
offence is aware of all the objective elements constituting the offence in ques-
tion.87 In addition to this cognitive element, the perpetrator has to carry out the
prohibited act with the required intent of the crime in question.
It is generally accepted in German jurisprudence that there are three differ-
ent forms of Vorsatz: Absicht or purpose (intent in the narrow sense or dolus
directus of ﬁrst degree); knowledge (dolus directus of second degree); and bed-
ingter Vorsatz (dolus eventualis).88 The third form of intent (bedingter Vorsatz)
is similar to the common law notion of recklessness, but it is more restricted
in a way that the perpetrator need not only be aware of the risk but must also
accept the possibility that the criminal consequence occurs.89 Each of these
forms will be examined accordingly.
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96 Code of Crimes against International Law adopted by both Chambers of the German
Parliament, entered into force on 30 June 2002 “Völkerstrafgesetzbuch”. The text of the Code,
as adopted is to be found in the Ofﬁcial Gazette of Germany (Bundesgesetzblatt 2002, No. 42
at 2254).
97 Triffterer, ‘Genocide. Its Particular Intent’, supra note 90, at 405.
A. Absicht or dolus directus of ﬁrst degree
Absicht is the gravest aspect of culpability in which the volitive part domi-
nates.90 In German law, it is generally assumed that an offender acts with
Absicht if he desires to bring about the result. In this type of intent, the per-
petartor’s “will” is directed ﬁnally towards the accomplishment of that result.91
Absicht is also deﬁned as a “purpose-bound will”.92 It is irrelevant in this type
of Vorsatz whether the intended (or desired) result is the defendant’s ﬁnal goal
or just a necessary interim goal in order to achieve the ﬁnal one.93 Accordingly,
dolus directus of ﬁrst degree is not synonymous with the defendant’s motive.94
The following example shall illustrate this: X poisoned her husband’s meal,
because she wants to proﬁt from his insurance. In this example, the victim’s
death is a necessary interim goal in order to realize the ﬁnal goal (obtaining the
insurance money). Therefore, X killed her husband with ﬁrst degree intent.
This is now the prevailing opinion.95 The same has to be applied to § 6 of the
German Code of Crimes against International Law (the crime of genocide).96
A génocidaire’s ﬁnal goal (ultimate aim) is to destroy in whole or in part a
group as such, his interim goal, however, is to kill members of this group.
Accordingly, both the génocidaire’s interim and ﬁnal goals are to be consid-
ered as ﬁrst degree intent, and neither of them is synonymous with the géno-
cidaire’s motive.
Most notably, Absicht requires a low intellectual threshold, but an extremely
high volitional element.97 With regard to the intellectual component of this type
of Vorsatz, it is sufﬁcient that the perpetrator considers the desired result as
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98 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 74.
99 Ibid.
100 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 44; Lenckner in Schönke
& Schröder, Strafrecht Kommentar, supra note 57, at 151.
101 Triffterer, ‘Genocide: Its Particular Intent’, supra note 90, at 402.
102 In determining that genocide occurred at Srebrenica the Krstic´ Appeals Chamber had this
to say:
“[. . .] the cardinal question is whether the intent to commit genocide existed. While this
intent must be supported by the factual matrix, the offence of genocide does not require
proof that the perpetrator chose the most efﬁcient method to accomplish his objective of
destroying the targeted group. Even where the method selected will not implement the 
“possible”. Even if the perpetrator is not fully aware that the consequences
might occur, he still can be held criminally responsible for intentional conduct
in the form of Absicht. Hence, the degree of probability is unimportant in this
matter. The following example shall illustrate this issue: If A ﬁres a riﬂe in the
direction of B who stands a mile away, A may know perfectly well that the
chance of hitting B is only one in a thousand; A may fully expect to miss him;
nevertheless A intended to hit B (in the form of dolus directus ﬁrst degree) if
A desires to do so; if it was A’s purpose.
Strictly speaking, Absicht as a form of Vorsatz (dolus directus of ﬁrst degree)
is not identical with Absicht as a “further” or “speciﬁc” mental element in some
offences provided for in the StGB which requires (besonderes subjektives
Tatbestandsmerkmal, or besondere Absicht).98 That is to say, Absicht not only
occurs as one of the three types of Vorsatz, but it also occurs as a special sub-
jective element in the provision of some criminal offences.99 A requirement for
besondere Absicht expressly appears in the case of theft “intention of appro-
priation” § 242 StGB; or “the intention to beneﬁt unjustly” in case of fraud 
(§ 263 StGB). In these types of criminal offences the requirement of Absicht
encompasses further consequence beyond the core conduct or result that con-
stitutes the actus reus of the offence. In other words, these offences have an
extended mental element (überschiessende Innentendenz).100 That is to say, in
such offences, a result has to be only intended and not yet to be achieved. This
modality of crimes is quite often chosen by the legislators in order to crimi-
nalize acts which because of this additional and therefore particular intent are
especially dangerous.101 Hence, these types of crimes which require a speciﬁc
absicht could be categorized as “ulterior intent crimes”. The same modality 
of crimes is provided for in § 6 of the German Code of Crimes against
International Law, where the actual destruction of a group as such, is not a
material element of the crime of genocide. The cardinal question in this type
of offences is that whether the perpetrator in carrying out the enumerated acts
which may constitute the material element of genocide possessed the genoci-
dal intent.102
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perpetrator’s intent to the fullest, leaving that destruction incomplete, this ineffectiveness
alone does not preclude a ﬁnding of genocidal intent.”
See Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, (Case No. IT-98-33-A), Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 32.
103 BGHSt 4, 108; see also BGHSt 9, 144, and vol. 13 at 221.
104 Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 370, with references to other schol-
arly opinions.
105 Ibid.
106 Cramer, in Schönke & Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar, supra note 91, at 264.
“Direkter Vorsatz liegt vor, wenn der Taeter sicheres Wissen davon hat, dass sein Verhalten die
Voraussetzungen eines Strafgesetzes erfüllt”; Lackner, Strafgesetzbuch, supra note 91, p. 96;
Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 213.
107 Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 298 
et seq.
108 Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 57, vol. 2, at 113; Jescheck
& Weigend, supra note 67, at 299.
109 BGHSt 18, 264.
110 In this case dolus directus ﬁrst degree does not apply because A did not aim for the crew’s
death. This fatal result was neither his ﬁnal goal nor a necessary interim gaol.
The BGH opines that Absicht has to be interpreted “according to the 
legal nature of the criminal offence and according to the purpose of deter-
rence the legislator pursued”.103 Yet, Absicht sometimes is interpreted by the
courts as dolus directus of second degree. But, this is only where Absicht is not
constitutive of the offence in question.104 Yet, in case of murder, where Absicht
is considered as a legal ingredient of the offence, (where Absicht gives the
offence its speciﬁc character), Absicht has to be applied in the strict sense.105
B. Dolus directus of second degree or dolus indirectus
The perpetrator acts with dolus directus of second degree, if he knows that his
conduct will fulﬁl the legal elements of an offence.106 In this form of Vorsatz
the perpetrator foresees the consequence of his conduct as being certain or
highly probable. This secondary consequence is not the perpetrator’s primary
purpose. It may be an undesired lateral consequence of the envisaged behav-
iour, but because the perpetrator acts indifferently with regard to the second
consequence, he is deemed to have desired this later result.107 Yet, in cases of
dolus directus of second degree the intellectual element (knowledge) domi-
nates, whereas the element of wilfulness is weak.108 It is not required that the
perpetrator desires to bring about the side-effect in question; knowledge is
sufﬁcient.109 In such cases the perpetrator may be indifferent or may even regret
the result. This may be clariﬁed by the following example: “X” places a time-
bomb on an aircraft. His purpose was to cause loss of property and make an
insurance claim. He is sure that a fatal crash will result from his conduct, and
the crew will die, although this is not his motivation. If he still acts, X will be
deemed to have wanted these killings also but, under the category of dolus
directus of second degree.110
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111 Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 115.
112 Ibid.; Roxin, Strafrecht, supra note 78, § 12, at 367 (Absicht [muss] nicht das Motiv, den
Endzweck [. . .] bezeichnen, sondern liegt auch vor, wenn der erstrebte Erfolg weiteren oder
anders gearteten Zielen des Täters dient).
113 BGHSt 21, 283 (vol. 21, at 283).
114 Ebke & Finkin, Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, at 388.
115 Dolus evantualis is a well known concept in most of the Continental law systems. This
type of Vorsatz is recognized under the Italian criminal law as dolo eventuale. Pursuant to Article
43 of Italian Codice Penale all serious crimes require proof of the mental element known as dolo,
which means that the prohibited result must be both preveduto (foreseen) and voluto (wanted).
According to the Italian law, a result may be voluto even though it is not desired if, having con-
templated the possibility of bringing it about by pursuing a course of conduct, the perpetrator is
prepared to run the risk of doing so dolo eventuale. Even a small risk may be voluto if the defen-
dant has reconciled himself to, or accepted it as a part of the price he was prepared to pay to
secure his objective, see Finbarr McAuley & J. Paul McCutcheon, Criminal Liabilty (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp. 301–3.
116 The term “bedingter Vorsatz” (conditional intent) is, however, misleading, because it is not
the intent which is conditional; on the contrary, a conditional has not yet reached the threshold
of “intent”, see Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 374. “Dolus eventualis, and
especially its element of “will”, are still a matter of dispute. On the one hand, case law con-
cerning this element is inconsistent. . . . On the other hand, a considerable number of penal law
scholars contend that dolus eventualis requires only an intellectual element, which most of them
On closer inspection, however, it is difﬁcult to ascertain the degree of
Vorsatz in cases where the perpetrator views the incidental consequences (the
death of the crew) as desirable. One opinion is that if the result is not the per-
petrator’s goal, although he is sure about its occurrence, it cannot constitute
ﬁrst degree intent, even though the incidental consequence is desirable.111
Conversely, if the perpetrator while carrying out a criminal conduct desires 
certain incidental consequence in addition to the primary desired consequence,
he is seen to posses two Absicht (intent of the ﬁrst degree). That is to say that
“he strives for another result as well as for the alleged incidental consequences
(both being his goals).”112
Most notably, the BGH argued that a perpetrator, who foresees a conse-
quence of his conduct as certain, is considered to act wilfully with regard to this
consequence, even if he regrets its occurrence.113 The Court also asserted that
wilfulness always exists on the part of the offender where the consequences are
foreseen as natural or certain. That is to say, the element of wilfulness is
deemed to be present by deﬁnition.114
C. Bedingter Vorsatz or dolus eventualis115
Generally speaking, bedingter Vorsatz is considered to be the usual minimum
level of culpability for criminal liability, and the highest disputed form of
Vorsatz in German criminal law.116 The most controversial question is what 
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deﬁne as foresight of “concrete possibility” see Heribert Schumann, ‘Criminal Law’ in Ebke &
Finkin (eds.), Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, at 389–90.
117 Sometimes referred to as “luxuria”, Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra
note 62, at 216.
118 Schumann, ‘Criminal Law’, supra note 116, at 389.
119 Still the perpetrator could be hold criminally responsible and liable for being conscious
negligence.
120 Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 90, pp. 445–46; See also Mihajlo Acimovic,
‘Conceptions of Culpability in Contemporary American Law’, 26 Louisiana Law Review
(1965) 28, 48 (describing a Romanist law test according to which the perpetrator acted inten-
tionally if he could have said to himself: It may be either so or different, it may happen either
so or differently; anyhow I shall act.) For a different opinion see Paul T. Smith, ‘Recklessness
in Dolus Eventualis’ 96 South African Law Journal (1979) 81 (criticizing South African law to
the extent that it interprets dolus eventualis as indifference rather than foresight).
121 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 90, at 446. This concept of reck-
lessness seems similar to the Model Penal Code’s, which requires conscious awareness of a sub-
stantial risk.
122 BGHSt 7, 363, quoted in Krey, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 117.
distinguishes dolus eventualis from conscious negligence (bewusste Fahr-
lässigkeit).117 In other words how can we draw the precise boundary between
bedingter Vorsatz and bewusste Fahrlässigkeit? In addition to that, there is a
need to distinguish between dolus eventualis from the two forms of dolus
directus, particularly, with regard to some deﬁnition of offences which requires
that the offender act “knowingly” or that he aim at a certain result.118
In principle, and in order to avoid any uncertainties or ambiguities which
may shadow the present discussion, we have to concede that dolus eventualis
the same as Absicht and dolus indirectus should comprise the two components
of Vorsatz “will” and “knowledge”. Thus, in case one of these components is
missing, dolus eventualis no longer exists on the part of the perpetrator.119
George Fletcher observes that the German law includes dolus eventualis
within the contours of intending a particular result. Dolus eventualis, as per-
ceived by Fletcher, is deﬁned as “a particular subjective posture toward the
result. The tests . . . vary; the possibilities include every thing from being
‘indifferent’ to the result, to ‘being reconciled’with the result as a possible cost
of attaining one’s goal.”120 Fletcher notes that dolus eventualis is considered an
aspect of intention, not of recklessness. He concludes, recklessness (or ‘con-
scious negligence’as it is called in German and Soviet law) requires an afﬁrma-
tive aversion to the harmful side-effect.121
The BGH Leather Belt case decided in 1957 is illustrative in this manner.122
The facts of the case can be summarized as follows: A and B intended to steal
O’s money and in order to avoid O’s resistance they tried to drug him, however,
this method did not work. Hence, they decided to strangle O with a leather belt
in order to prevent his resistance. For fear of killing O, they ﬁrst tried to stun
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123 Ibid.
124 BGHSt 7, 368–370.
125 Krey, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 119.
126 Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court; hereinafter refer to as “BGH ”), Case No. 5
StR 623/95 in “Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport” (hereinafter “NStZ-
RR”) p. 323 (East German soldier shooting (without direct intent to kill) refugee at the Berlin
Wall pursuant to standing orders “to annihilate violators of the border” not guilty of homicide;
ofﬁcer reading said standing order to his troops on a daily basis not guilty of instigation to com-
mit homicide); BGH 5 StR 139/95 in “Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen”
(Ofﬁcial Reporter of the German Supreme Court, decisions in criminal matters; hereinafter
“BGHSt”) vol. 41 pp. 149–152 (same; also no co-perpetration by soldiers acting independently);
BGH 5 StR 88/93 in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht” (hereinafter “NStZ”) 1993 pp. 488–489;
no instigation or aiding and abetting in acts of others); BGH 2 StR 513/94 (same; also no lia-
bility for assault/battery if direct order to shoot given on the spot was not unlawful on its face);
BGH 2 StR 329/00 at: <http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/2/00/2-329-.php3> (no intentional
homicide in pre-wall case of shootings at the intra-German border); generally, see further BGH
4 StR 271/99 in “Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht” (hereinafter “NZV) pp. 88–89; BGH 4 StR
him, hitting him using a sandbag in order to make him unconscious. When this
failed, they strangled O with the belt until he could not move anymore. While
doing so, they realized that O could be strangled to death. This insight appeared
unpleasant to them, however, they wanted to “put him out of action” at all
costs.123 The BGH afﬁrmed A’s and B’s intent to kill in the type of dolus even-
tualis. The Court ruled that dolus eventualis requires that the offender ‘fore-
sees’ the consequences ‘as possible’ ( fuer moeglich halten) and ‘approves
them’ (‘billigen’, ‘billigend in Kauf nehmen’).124 The BGH opines that both A
and B accepted the fact that O could die while strangling him and therefore
approved this result.
Even though, “approval of the result” could be seen as a decisive criterion
in distinguishing between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence, the
employment of this term by the BGH is misleading. The reason is that approv-
ing the unlawful consequence implicitly requires that this consequence is
desired by the perpetrator. The Court went further asserting that even undesired
result could be approved of.125
In Germany, a court will not make a ﬁnding of dolus eventualis if the
accused, in addition to being uncertain whether his conduct would lead to the
speciﬁc injury suffered by the victim, sincerely believed or hoped that this
injury would not occur. At this case he acts negligently (negligent conduct
despite the apparent possibility of harm). The sole fact that the accused has
taken a particularly great risk (and even intended to cause a lesser form of
harm, e.g., intended to injure, but not to kill the victim) will not sufﬁce for a
conviction for intentional homicide based on a ﬁnding of dolus eventualis, even
if the accused’s act was in fact highly dangerous and a neutral observer would
not have had any doubt that the victim’s life was placed at great risk, and if the
accused had the general notion that his act was probably unlawful.126
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642/95 in “Strafverteidiger” (hereinafter “StV”) 1997 p. 7; BGH 4 StR 275/96 in NStZ-RR 1996
pp. 355–356; BGH 4 StR 258/86 in NStZ 1987 pp. 284–285.
127 BGH NStZ 2000, 165 quoted in Greg Taylor, ‘Concepts of Intention in German Criminal
Law’, 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2004) 99.
128 BGHSt 36, 1; 44, 99; BGH NStZ (Neue Zeitschrift fuer Strafrecht) 1999 (year), p. 507;
BGH NStZ 2000, 583.
129 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 76.
130 Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 376.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
Recently, dolus eventualis was discussed by the Federal Supreme Court in
the Doner Shop Case.127 In this case the accused disliked foreigners, and in
order to drive some Turkish people out of Germany, he set their doner kebab
shop on ﬁre. The consequences of the accused’s act was the complete destruc-
tion of the building concerned, and the injury of Y who was at the shop by that
time. The Court held that intention to kill would exist if the accused ‘consid-
ered the occurrence of the proscribed result [i.e. the death of K] to be a not
entirely distant possibility and, further, [if] he approved of it or reconciled him-
self to it for the sake of attaining his desired goal’ that is the removal of the
Turks from Germany. If, on the other hand, the Court continued, the accused
had ‘earnestly, and not merely in a vague way, relied on the non-occurrence of
a fatal result’, he was to be acquitted of attempted homicide as he lacked the
necessary intention to commit it. Yet, one might deduce that dolus eventualis
as deﬁned by the Federal Supreme Court has to encompass two elements,
namely, knowledge of a mere possibility of the proscribed result, and a voli-
tional element which does not reach the threshold of wilfulness. Dolus even-
tualis, however, was treated differently according to the following theories:
1. Consent and approval theory
This theory is applied by the courts,128 and is usually referred to as the “theory
on consent and approval” (Einwilligungs- und Billigungstheorie).129
The majority of German legal scholars who ascribe to this theory, use a
slightly different deﬁnition for dolus eventualis. They are of the opinion that
the offender must “seriously consider” (ernstnehmen) the result’s occurrence
and must “accept the fact” that his conduct could fulﬁl the legal elements of the
offence.130 Another way of putting the point is to say the offender must “rec-
oncile himself ” (sich abﬁnden) to the prohibited result.131
If, to the contrary, the offender is “conﬁdent” (vertrauen) and has reason to
believe that the result – though he foresees it as a possibility – will not occur,
he lacks dolus eventualis and acts only negligently.132
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133 BGH St 7, 363, pp. 369, 370.
134 Ibid.
135 The indifference theory is supported by Cramer & Sternberg-Lieben in: Schönke-
Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, supra note 79, at 268 et seq. “dolus eventualis (ist)
gegeben, wenn der Täter die Tatbestandsverwirklichung für möglich haelt und aus
Gleichgültigkeit gegenueber dem geschuetzten Rechtsgut in Kauf nimmt.” Ibid., at 269.
The prevailing opinions as well as the courts’view show that in case of dolus
eventualis both knowledge and wilfulness must be present. As for the requisite
component of knowledge, it is, however, sufﬁcient that the offender foresees
the consequences as “possible”; as for the component of wilfulness, the
offender has to “approve” the result or “reconcile himself” with the result. But
“approving the result” as a requirement for the volitional element in case of
dolus eventualis does not mean that the result is desirable to the perpetrator.
The BGH clariﬁed this issue asserting that this form of Vorsatz (dolus indi-
rectus) may also be assumed. The Court considered that the defendant
approved the result, where in order to realise the pursued gaol, he accepted the
fact that his conduct could bring about the actually undesired result.133 The
BGH went on drawing the boarders between bedingter Vorsatz (dolus eventu-
alis) and bewussten Fahrlässigkeit (conscious negligence) asserting that the
perpetrator who trusts in the non-occurrence of the undesired result is merely
acting with conscious negligence, but not with dolus eventualis.134
2. Indifference theory “Gleichgültigkeitstheorie”
According to the “indifference theory”, the volitive element of dolus eventu-
alis is present, if the offender is indifferent to the occurrence of the result which
he foresees as possible.135 It could be seen that this theory is similar to the “con-
sent and approval theory”. In the Leather Belt Case, however, the application
of the “indifference theory” would lead to the acquittal of the defendants as far
as murder / intentional killing is concerned. This is because the defendants
were not indifferent to the death of the victim O, to the contrary, the death of
O was highly undesired.
3. The Intellectual theory
According to the prevailing theories, it is by means of the component of wil-
fulness that dolus eventualis is distinguished from conscious negligence. There
are, however, other theories on dolus eventualis discussed among scholars,
which refrain from the component of wilfulness. Rather, they restrict dolus
eventualis to the intellectual component. Moreover, they negate the existence
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136 Schmidhäuser, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (1975) 89; Jakobs, Strafrecht Allgemeiner
Teil, (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1991) 269, 270.
137 See Lenckner, in: Schönke-Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, supra note 57, at 240; Jescheck &
Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 302.
138 Krey, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 2, supra note 57, at 125.
139 Ibid.
of a conscious form of negligence. From this point of view, a distinction
between dolus eventualis and negligence is unnecessary.
4. The Possibility theory
The “possibility theory” requires that the offender must recognize a substan-
tial or a considerable possibility that the result could materialize.136 In other
words, if the defendant foresees or recognises the result as ‘concretely possi-
ble’ he acts with dolus eventualis.137 The upholders of the “possibility theory”
argue that the envisaged possibility of a prohibited result as such should have
halted the offender from acting. If he still decides to act, he should be punished
for intentional conduct. Hence, pursuant to the “possibility theory” Vorsatz can
not be understood as acting with both knowledge and wilfulness. Rather, it
eliminates the intent’s component of ‘will’. However, it is doubtful whether the
element of wilfulness is dispensable. Firstly, Vorsatz should comprise two com-
ponents, an intellectual and a volitional component. Secondly, according to this
theory there are no borderlines to be drawn between dolus eventualis and con-
scious negligence. The following case shall illustrate this matter:
“X is driving his car on a country road. In spite of low visibility due to fog,
he overtakes a truck. While doing so he is fully aware that his overtaking
is grossly contrary to road trafﬁc regulations as well as daredevil and per-
ilous. Despite his awareness of the risk, X seriously trusts in his conduct
not resulting in accident. However, when overtaking he causes a serious
trafﬁc accident in which an oncoming motorcyclist is killed”. Did X com-
mit manslaughter?138
According to the possibility theory X is seen to have possessed the intent to kill
(dolus eventualis) since he has realized the possibility of the result’s occur-
rence.139 According to the possibility theory, even though, X had seriously
trusted the non-occurrence of the result (the death of another person), and thus,
had not accepted this fatal result, he is still considered to posses the intent to
kill (dolus eventualis).
5. The Probability theory
Contrary to the “possibility theory”, the “probability theory”, requires aware-
ness of a higher degree of risk, particularly, the defendant must have consid-
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141 Hellmuth Mayer, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967) 121; see also
Jakobs, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 136, at 270.
142 See the possibilty theory at the present study.
143 H. Mayer, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967) 121.
144 Reinhard von Frank, Strafgesetzbuch, (Tübingen : Mohr 1931), § 59.
145 Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 385: “Erkenntnismittel zur
Feststellung des Vorsatzes”.
146 Michaels, ‘Acceptance: The Missing Mental State’, supra note 88, at 1027.
147 Ibid.
ered the prohibited result to be likely.140 According to this theory, an offender
acts with dolus eventualis, if he foresees that the occurrence of the prohibited
result is “probable.”141 Like the “possibility theory”, the “probability theory”
does not refer to any element of wilfulness and is therefore subject to the same
criticism. The “probability theory” has also been criticized for using a very
vague criterion.142 “Probable” is deﬁned to be “more than possible, but less than
predominantly probable”.143 The deﬁnition reveals its vagueness, nevertheless,
the probability theory would lead to the same conclusion adopted by the BGH
in the Leather Belt Case.
6. Frank Formula
Most notably, the Frank Formula144 is not considered to be a proper deﬁnition
of dolus eventualis but rather a means to inquire into the mental states of an
offender.145 According to Frank, if the perpetrator is aware of the possibility of
the circumstance or consequence, then the proper inquiry is the following:
How would the perpetrator have behaved with sure knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of the offence? . . . If one comes to the result that the perpe-
trator would also have acted with certain knowledge, then . . . Vorsatz is to
be afﬁrmed; if one comes to the result that with certain knowledge he
would have refrained from action, then Vorsatz is to be rejected.146
Frank’s hypothetical test was followed by the Federal High Court in a case
involving the crime of false accusation. The critical point in this case was
whether in circulating a report which falsely charged a government ofﬁcial of
accepting a bribe, the defendant was reckless with regard to its falsity.
Addressing this point the Federal High Court ruled that:
Vorsatzlish action . . . is present when someone not only doubts the cor-
rectness of his suspicion, but beyond that, is positive that he would also
have cast suspicion with knowledge of its incorrectness. By contrast, if he
would have refrained from casting suspicion if its falseness were known
to him, then he is burdened by no vorsatzlich action in spite of his
doubts.147
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his students to swim in a dangerous river, ignoring or failing to notice a warning sign, and some
students are injured, he is criminal liable for causing bodily harm by negligence.
The “theory of the non-manifested will of avoidance” by Armin Kaufmann, according to 
this theory, an offender acts with dolus eventualis, if he took no efforts to avoid the occurrence
of the result. See Armin Kaufmann, Zeitschrift fuer die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft
1958, 64, 73.
149 BGHSt 36, 1–20 [9–10].
150 The advantage of this rule of construction in the dStGB and most of the Continental juris-
diction is that the legislator could simplify the code by omitting references to intentional con-
duct. Accordingly, where a provision is silent on the form of culpability, it would be read as
requiring an intentional conduct.
Being aware of the restrictive nature of Frank’s formula which does not
exhaust the possibilities of bedingter Vorsatz, the Federal High Court con-
cluded that in the false accusation context, this formula would draw a clear line
that would accurately distinguish the indisputably punishable cases.148
To conclude, and according to the established jurisprudence of the Federal
Supreme Court (BGH), acting with dolus eventualis requires that the perpe-
trator perceive the occurrence of the criminal result as possible and not com-
pletely remote, and that he endorse it or at least come to terms with it for the
sake of the desired goal. In the case of extremely dangerous, violent acts, it is
obvious that the perpetrator takes into account the possibility of the victim’s
death and, since he continues to carry out the act, he accepts such a result. The
volitional element denotes the borderline between dolus eventualis and advert-
ent or conscious negligence.149
VI. Fahrlässigkeit or (negligence)
According to the German Criminal Code (deutsches Strafgesetzbuch – dStGB),
negligence (Fahrlässigkeit), however gross ( fahrlässige Tötung), does not
carry criminal responsibility unless a particular provision provides for its pun-
ishment.150 This is clear from the words of section §15 of the Criminal Code
StGB which provides “Strafbar ist nur vorsätzliches Handeln, wenn nicht das
Gesetz fahrlässiges Handeln ausdrüecklich mit Strafe bedroht”, “only inten-
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151 See § 15 StGB.
152 Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 568.
153 Case is reproduced in: Deutscher Reichstag, Stenographische Berichte, at 2568 ff.; see also
Claud Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account of the War Criminals’ Trials and a Study of
German Mentality (London 1921) at 151 ff.
tional acts are punishable, unless the law expressly threatens negligent acts
with punishment.”151
Although not deﬁned by the StGB, criminal negligence, is deﬁned as con-
scious or unconscious deviation from the required standard of care which
causes a result prohibited by criminal law: this may occur either (a) because the
actor wrongfully does not consider the consequences of his conduct (uncon-
scious negligence); or (b) if the actor envisaged their occurrence, because he
wrongfully relied on the idea that the result would not occur (conscious neg-
ligence/culpable negligence/culpa gravis).152
In 1921 the Leipzig Supreme Court found that Crusius, a captain of the
German Army, was guilty of causing ‘death through culpable negligence’
( fahrlässige Tötung). In this case the accused acting under erroneous assump-
tion that his superior Major-General Stenger, had verbally ordered the killing
of all French wounded, he (the accused) passed on this alleged order to his
company. The Court ruled that:
“The act of ‘will’ which in the further course of events caused the objec-
tively illegal outcome . . . included an act of carelessness which ran con-
trary to his duty, and neglect of the consideration required in the situation
at hand which was perfectly reasonable to expect from the accused. Had
he applied the care required of him, he would not have failed to notice what
many of his men realized immediately, namely that the indiscriminate
killing of all wounded represented an outrages, and by no means justiﬁable
war manoeuvre.”153
The Court went on saying that:
“Captain Crusius was certainly familiar with the provisions of the ﬁeld
operating procedures which require a written order as the basis for troop
command by the higher troop leaders, as well as the drill manual which
makes the written order a rule, especially concerning orders for brigades
and higher. This circumstance is also not entirely without signiﬁcance, par-
ticularly in view of the personality of the accused who was described as a
diligent, zealous, and benevolent ofﬁcer. In view of the accused’s back-
ground and personality, he should have anticipated the illegal outcome
which was easily demonstrated even if his mental and emotional states at
the time were to be fully taken into consideration.”
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154 Conﬁrmed in BGH v. 7. 6. 1994–4 StR 105/94, reproduced in Strafverteidiger (StV) 1994,
654 (and BGH v. 22. 2. 2000 – 5 StR 573/99, reproduced in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht –
Rechtsprechungsreport (NStZ-RR) 2000, 165), quoted in Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Appeals
Judgment, supra note 1, footnote 73.
155 Thus, German Criminal Code explicitly departs from what is referred to in the German lit-
erature as the theory of intent (Vorsatztheorie). This theory proposes to treat knowledge of
unlawfulness and knowledge of other elements of a crime equally (e.g., factual elements)
‘equal treatment doctrine’. Most notably this theory was overruled by § 17 of the StGB. For fur-
ther details on the Vorsatztheorie and the ‘equal treatment doctrine’ see Gunther Arzt, ‘The
Problem of Mistake of Law’, Brigham Young University Law Review (1986) 711, 714–716. In
Common law systems, mistake of fact is recognised as a defence. Where the law requires inten-
tion or recklessness with respect to some element in the actus reus, a mistake, whether reason-
able or not, will negate the mens rea and therefore will be considered as an excuse. Where the
law requires only negligence, then only a reasonable mistake can afford a defence since an unrea-
sonable mistake is itself a negligent act.
156 Gunther Arzt, ‘Ignorance or Mistake of Law’, 24 The American Journal of Comparative
Law (1976) 646, 649. “In German, unlike Anglo-American law a mistake of fact, whether rea-
“According to the established jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court
on the delimitation of dolus eventualis and conscious/advertent negli-
gence, the perpetrator is acting intentionally if he recognizes as possible
and not entirely unlikely the fulﬁlment of the elements of an offence and
agrees to it in such a way that he approves the fulﬁlment of the elements
of the offence or at least reconciles himself with it in order to reach the
intended result, even if he does not wish for the fulﬁlment of the elements
of the crime; conscious negligence means that the perpetrator does not
agree with the fulﬁlment of the elements of the crime – which he recog-
nizes as possible – and seriously – not only vaguely – trusts that the
fulﬁlment will not come about.”154
Having examined the different forms of Vorsatz in German criminal law the
following section will examine and discuss the grounds of excluding intention
or guilt namely, mistake of fact, and mistake of law.
V. Grounds of excluding the Vorsatz or Schuld
Generally speaking, the German Criminal Code (dStGB) distinguishes between
two kinds of mistakes, namely: mistakes of fact relating to the elements of the
offence (Tatbestandsirrtum, § 16), and mistakes of law relating to the unlaw-
fulness of the act (Verbotsirrtum, § 17).155 The former, in so far as they corre-
spond the legal element of the crime in question, exclude the criminal intent
(Vorsatz) regardless of whether they are reasonable, whereas the latter do
not.156 Mistake of law, however, may constitute a ground of excluding culpa-
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sonable or not, precludes intent”; Nigel G. Foster, German Law and Legal System, (London:
Blackstone Press Limited, 1993) 171.
“Mistakes of fact includes the concept of intent, and thus the grounds of justiﬁcation of con-
sent or excuse (Irrtum über Entschuldigungsgründe). Thus, if intent is a necessary element
of the crime, mistake of fact, whether reasonable or not, precludes convictions for inten-
tional crimes, which are the most common traditional type of crime. The only other ground
for criminal conviction under these circumstances is negligence, in those exceptional
cases where the Criminal Code expressly prescribes punishment for negligent behaviour
and does not include intent as a necessary element of the crime.”
157 Formerly, mistake of facts and mistake of law were treated equally. The so-called
“Vorsatztheorie” (theory of intent) proposed that the knowledge of the factual components of
the offence and knowledge of the legal prohibition as such are equal elements within the con-
cept of intent. An offender who lacks the knowledge of the legal prohibition has no conscious-
ness of wrongdoing “Unrechtsbewusstsein” see, Arzt, ‘Ignorance or Mistake of Law’supra note
154, at 653–4. This theory is, however, overruled by § 17 dStGB which provides that not the
intent, but the culpability/guilt is excluded.
158 The Reichsgericht (court of the Reich) did not distinguish between mistake of fact and mis-
take of law; failure to know the law meant absence of intent. The mistake of law (error as to pro-
hibition) was acknowledged by the Great Senate of the BGH in 1952 and was subsequently
introduced in the Criminal Code as § 17 dStGB. BGH 2, 194 (201); Jescheck & Weigend, supra
note 67, at 452.
159 This issue could be easily understood by thinking of the insanity defence. As framed in
most United States jurisdictions, that defence operates not by negating the intent element in the
deﬁnition of an offence, but as an independent ground for denying culpability. The parallel in
the context of the German mistake analysis is that mistake of law operates as an independent
denial of culpability (Schuld). Most notably some States have narrowed the scope of the insan-
ity defence by declaring it to be a defence only if it negates the intent element in the deﬁnition
of the crime in question. For example, § 75–2–305 (Supp. 1985) of the Utah Code. This Code
conceptualises the insanity defence as one that excludes intent rather than as a separate defence,
see Arzt ‘The Problem of Mistake of Law’, supra note 155, at 714, footnote 8.
bility (Schuldausschließungsgrund). That is to say, German criminal law does
not follow the principle “ignorance of the law is no defence” (error iuris
nocet) which is widely recognized in common law countries. Hence, one must
carefully distinguish between a factual mistake,157 and a mistake of law.158
A. The basic distinction between mistake of fact & mistake of law
As mentioned above, German criminal law’s ﬁrst principle in treating mistake
is the explicit distinction between mistake of fact which negates the defendant’s
intent, and mistake of law which does not exclude intent but the culpability.159
Generally speaking, mistakes of fact occur where the defendant mistakes
one person or object for another, whereas in case of a mistake of law, the defen-
dant is fully aware of all circumstances and the conduct he is carrying out. In
the latter case, the defendant believes that his conduct does not constitute an
offence; that the offence does not count in the given circumstances; or that the
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160 Foster, German Law & Legal System, supra note 156, at 17.
161 Matthias Neuner, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law in Germany’, in
Matthias Neuner (ed.), National Legislation Incorporating International Crimes, (Berlin:
Berliner Wisseenchafts-Verlag 2003) 105, 120.
162 Ibid.
163 § 16 subsection I, phrase 1 StGB.
164 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 82.
165 Ibid.
offence does not fall into the scope of a criminal provision.160 That is to say, the
defendant is not mistaken about the existence of a (purely) objective element
with respect to the crime in question. In other words, mistake of law occurs in
situations where the defendant, though aware about all relevant details of the
offence, still acts under the (erroneous) assumption that his conduct is within
the law.161 This error cannot exclude the intent since the defendant acts know-
ingly and intentionally with respect to all objective elements of the offence, it
may, however, affect the culpability/guilt of the defendant concerned, but in a
distinct way. If the error was “avoidable”, a mitigation of sentence may be con-
sidered, whereas if the error was unavoidable, culpability (Schuld) of the
defendant concerned shall be completely excluded with the effect that the
defendant will not be convicted.162
B. Tatbestandsirrtum or mistake of fact
A factual mistake excluding the intent is given where the perpetrator lacks
knowledge of a physical legal element of the respective criminal offence. This
is set out in §16 (1) of the StGB:
“Wer bei Begehung der Tat einen Umstand nicht kennt, der zum gesetz-
lichen Tatbestand gehört, handelt nicht vorsätzlich. Die Strafbarkeit
wegen fahrlässiger Begehung bleibt unberührt.” “Whoever, while com-
mitting the criminal offence, has no knowledge about a circumstance
being part of the legal elements, does not act intentionally. The criminal
liability for negligent action remains unaffected.”163
The knowledge of a “circumstance” as it is employed in § 16 of the StGB
means that the offender was not aware of at least one of the objective elements
of the offence.164 It is required that the offender did not even take into account
the possibility that an objective element was given.165
The following example shall illustrate this issue: A shot dead a human
being under the assumption that it is a scarecrow. In this case A is not crimi-
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166 Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 406.
167 It is rare to ﬁnd a material element of a purely descriptive character. Most of them have a
double nature being both descriptive and normative. For instance, within criminal law the term
“human being” requires a value judgment in order to determine at white time human life begins
and at white time it ends. Hence, the beginning and the end of human life mark two borders (at
what time human life begins and at what time it ends) this is considered as a normative legal ele-
ment which requires a value judgment. Krey has observed that the legal term “taking away” as
employed in § 242 StGB (theft) is of a completely normative nature, and accordingly, it does
need of a value judgment, see Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 57, at
145.
168 “This is due to the psychological experience that the perception of a fact by the human
senses must be transformed into a conceptual picture in order to be perceived as a deﬁnitional
element of the crime.” See Albin Eser, ‘Mental Elements-Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law’
in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), I The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: ACommentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 889, 921.
169 This is the prevailing scholarly opinion which is followed by the BGH (Federal Supreme
Court of Justice) BGHSt 3, 248, 255. See Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, supra
note 57, at 141 footnote 125.
170 BGHSt 3, 248 (255); 4, 347 (352), Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts
Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 295; Cramer & Sternberg-Lieben, in Schoenke & Schroeder,
Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, supra note 79, at 231.
nally liable for intentional killing. If A, however, considered the risk that the
scarecrow could be a human being, he would be liable for intentional killing
in the form of dolus eventualis.166 That is to say, only full ignorance of one or
more material elements of the respective offence can be considered as a mis-
take of fact.
Most notably, German criminal law recognizes two distinct natures of 
material elements, namely: descriptive and normative elements.167 Descriptive
legal elements of the offence describe things or events which are perceivable
by means of the human senses. In this case the perpetrator must obviously
know that a body which is being shot at is not a scarecrow but a human being.
On the contrary, normative elements refer to terms which cannot be perceived,
but which need legal evaluation, for example third party’s property in case of
theft. In this case mere factual knowledge does not sufﬁce.168 Rather, the
defendant has to correctly recognize the socio-legal signiﬁcance of the mate-
rial element in question; at least like a reasonable man (Parallelwertung in der
Laiensphäre) (so-called ‘parallel/comparative valuation in the sphere of a lay-
man’).169 Accordingly, it is not required that the offender goes into complicated
legal analysis, but he must understand the legal element from a layman’s point
of view.170
A commonly used example is the beer mat case, the number of drinks 
consumed in a pub is counted by drawing signs on the beer mat. Thus, 
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171 Arzt, ‘The Problem of Mistake of Law’, supra note 155, at 716.
172 Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 311;
Cramer, in Schönke & Schröder, § 15 side number 59; Lackner, Strafgesetzbuch, supra note 91
§ 15 side number 13; See also a famous case often referred to Rose-Rosahl, Prussian Supreme
Tribunal GA 7 [1859], 332.
manipulating the beer mat can constitute the offence of “forgery of docu-
ments”, so long as the beer mat serves as a document. Although the precise
legal deﬁnition of the legal element “document” may be unknown to ordinary
beer consumers, the law is proceeding on the assumption that a layman is able
to understand the socio-legal meaning of the beer mat as a record for the con-
sumed drinks when footing the bill. Due to the “parallel valuation on the
sphere of a reasonable man”, the “forger” may be considered as acting with
intent regarding all elements of “forgery of documents”. To make it more clear,
mistakes about normative elements of the offence which require a legal eval-
uation (at least as a layman) are treated as mistakes of fact.171
Most notably, one important consequence in the case of a factual mistake
must be stressed: since a factual mistake excludes the intent, the defendant can-
not be convicted for any intentional offences. However, as the law explicitly
states, liability for negligent action stands unaffectedly. Hence, a perpetrator
shooting at a human being while believing that it is a scarecrow (above-men-
tioned case), cannot be held liable for intentional killing of that person, but he
will still be held criminally liable for negligent killing/manslaughter.
C. Error in persona & error in objecto
Error in persona vel obiecto is an error as to the identity of the victim or as 
to the identity of an object (i.e. A kills C believing that he is B). Most notably,
the error in persona vel obiecto does not affect the intent, where the persons or
the objects that have been mistaken for another by the defendant are of equal
value. This is the absolutely prevailing opinion in German criminal law.172 The
underlying argument is that the defendant’s “will” was directed towards the
realization of a prohibited consequence, and that his conduct caused this 
consequence. Hence, in this case, all the subjective and objective elements of
the criminal offence are fulﬁlled, and the mistake as to the speciﬁc identity of
a person or an object is considered as an error concerning the motive
(Motivirrtum), which is irrelevant to the legal elements of the offence
(Tatbestand). In this case both A and B are subjects of legal protection
(Rechtsgueter) of equal value, and the conduct is directed towards the achieve-
ment of the same prohibited consequence (death of a human being).
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173 See the Act to introduce the Code of Crimes against International Law adopted by both
Chambers of the German Parliament, entered into force on 30 June 2002 (Völkerstraf-
gesetzbuch). The text of the code, as adopted is to be found in the Ofﬁcial Gazette of Germany
(Bundesgesetzblatt 2002 I, No. 42 p. 2254 et seq.
174 Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, at 84.
Error in persona, however, could negate the mental element in cases of lack-
ing legal equivalence between the injured object of the act as imagined by the
perpetrator and the one actually injured. The following hypothetical case shall
illustrate this: A intended to destroy a religious group X by poisoning the main
water pipe which provides group X with its daily water. Unfortunately, A has
mistakenly poisoned another water pipe, causing severe casualties in group Y.
Did A commit genocide?
A has fulﬁlled the physical legal elements of murder by poisoning. His error
to the victims’ identity does not exclude his intent with respect to the respec-
tive offence, since the lives of group X and Y are legally of equal value.
On the contrary, according to § 6 of the new German Code of Crimes
against International Law,173 the error in persona exclude the intent: with
regard to this provision (whoever with the intent of destroying as such . . . a
national, racial, religious, or ethnic group) group B and C are not legally
equal. A’s error in persona, therefore, leads to an error as to the legal elements
of the respective offence (factual mistake, § 16 subs. 1 phrase 1 StGB). From
a legal point of view, A could be held criminally responsible for attempted
genocide with regard to group X, in addition to murder by poisoning (with
regard to group Y). This opinion is justiﬁed on the basis that A had physically
carried out an act with the requisite intent to commit genocide and forming part
of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission, if it were not
interrupted (A mistakenly poisoned a water pipe belongs to group Y).
D. Aberratio ictus
Aberratio ictus means that the “act goes amiss”. The Latin expression is used
to describe the following situation: A shoots at B, but instead of hitting B, the
bullet unexpectedly hits and kills C. The difference between error in persona/
objecto and aberratio ictus lies in the fact that in the former, the offender killed
the person he had individualized as a target, in case of aberratio ictus, the
offender does not kill the person he had individualized.174 In case of an error
in persona, the offender aims to kill the person he had in his sight and he suc-
ceeds in hitting this person at target, but he was mistaken about the identity of
this person. In case of an aberratio ictus, the offender wants to kill the person
he had in his sight, but he does not succeed in killing this person (i.e. because
his bullet was deﬂected) with the result that another person is killed.
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175 BGHSt 34, 55; Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 78, at 437; Jakobs, Strafrecht
Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 136, at 303; Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, supra
note 62, at 84.
176 Puppe, GA (Goldthammer’s Archiv) 1981, p. 1.
177 Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 313.
178 H. Jescheck, Lerbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 3rd ed., (Berlin, 1978) at 245 
et seq.
179 In the common law systems, ignorance of law is generally held to be no defence to crim-
inal liability. In Grant v. Borg (2 All. E R., p. 263), Lord Bridge said that “the principle that igno-
rance of law is no defence in crime is so fundamental that to construe the word ‘knowingly’ in
a criminal statute as requiring not merely knowledge of facts material to the offender’s mind,
but also knowledge of the relevant law, would be revolutionary, and, to my mind, wholly unac-
ceptable”.
Most notably, a mistake of law may constitute a defence in war crimes trials just as it may
before national courts. This has been illustrated in cases where executioners of allied victims
have, on occasion, been found not guilty on the ground of their having reasonably believed that
According to the Courts and the prevailing opinion in German criminal law,
aberratio ictus has the effect, that the offender can be held criminally liable for
negligence with respect to the murdered person, and with attempted murder
with respect to the targeted person. That is to say, A is not criminally liable for
intentional killing of C, but for negligent killing of C and for attempt of killing
B.175 A minority opinion, however, considered A criminally liable for inten-
tional killing of C.176 This opinion argued that A killed a subject of legal pro-
tection of the same value (both B and C are human beings). Thus, the minority
opinion wants to apply the same reasoning as in case of error in persona vel
obiecto. The minority opinion overlooked the decisive difference between
error in persona and aberratio ictus. In the former, the offender had the same
person in his sight he killed in the end. Therefore, there is no relevant devia-
tion from the causal course of events the offender expected. In case of aberratio
ictus, to the contrary, the deviation from the planned or envisaged course of
events is obvious. Hence, error in persona and aberratio ictus cannot be
treated equally.177
To sum up, in German criminal law the mental state of the defendant must
be present in relation to all the elements of the actus reus. Accordingly, mis-
take of fact is thus considered to be a circumstance which may negate the intent
to commit the crime under consideration.178
E. Mistake of law
As noted above, German criminal law does not follow the principle error iuris
nocet.179 Notably, German criminal law recognizes that a mistake of law can
ICLA 5,2_f3_202-246  5/25/05  4:09 PM  Page 240
MENS REA – MISTAKE OF LAW & MISTAKE OF FACT 241
the executions which they were carrying out were legal. This issue arose in the Amelo Trial (Trial
of Otto Sandrock and three others ‘Amelo Trial’, 1945, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,
Vol. I at 62–65, British Military Court). The relevant consideration being whether the three
accused were carrying out the unlawful sentence of Pilot Gerald Hood, who was taken to the
woods and killed by a shot in the back of the neck. In his statement to the court, the Judge
Advocate stated set out the test for a mistaken belief as comprised of both ‘honest’ and ‘rea-
sonable’. These criteria were articulated in the following two questions put to the court:
(1) If you are not satisﬁed that there exists any evidence upon which you can ﬁnd that these
men honestly believed that the British ofﬁcer had been tried according to law and that
they were carrying out a lawful execution, then you must reject the defence.
(2) If you are satisﬁed that the existing circumstances were such that a reasonable man
might have believed that this ofﬁcer had been tried according to law and that they were
carrying out a proper judicial legal execution then it would be open to the court to acquit
the accused.
In considering the issue of reasonableness, the Judge Advocate raised the issue of whether it 
was the duty of the accused, who were given the order from a forceful and determined ofﬁcer,
to ask questions or request further information from the SS lieutenant regarding the legality of
the execution.
180 See section II(C) of the present study.
exclude the criminal responsibility. This is explicitly laid down in § 17 dStGB,
a provision dealing with error as to the prohibition (Verbotsirrtum). If the
offender is mistaken about the unlawfulness of his act, he may escape crimi-
nal liability. However, the legal requisites have to be fulﬁlled, particularly, the
mistake must have been “unavoidable”.
It should be mentioned that due to the high threshold of unavoidability, mis-
takes of law rarely occur in praxi. This is because everybody should know the
law and the criminal offences provided for in the criminal code.
1. Error as to the prohibition Verbotsirrtum
An error as to the prohibition does not affect the Vorsatz, but it may exclude the
culpability Schuld.180 This is expressly provided for in § 17 dStGB:
“Fehlt dem Täter bei Begehung der Tat die Einsicht, Unrecht zu tun, so
handelt er ohne Schuld, wenn er diesen Irrtum vermeiden konnte, Konnte
der Täter den Irrtum nicht vermeiden, so kann die Strafe nach § 49 Abs. 1
gemildert werden.” “If the perpetrator, while committing the offence, is not
aware to act unlawfully, his guilt is excluded, provided that he could not
have avoided this mistake. Provided that he could have avoided this mis-
take, the punishment may be mitigated according to § 49 subpara. 1.”
Thus, an error as to the prohibition is given, if the offender believes that he is
acting in accordance with the law, and not committing any wrongdoing. In this
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181 BGHSt GrS (Great Senate), 2, 194 (197).
182 Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 67, at 456.;
Wessels & Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, supra note 62, § 11, side number 456 ff. at 160.
183 Ebke & Finkin, Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, at 395–96.
case, the offender knows what he is doing; he is not mistaken about his factual
conduct; however, he is convinced about the lawfulness of his conduct.181
It is worth mentioning that German criminal law differentiates between two
different types of error as to the prohibition, namely: (a) a direct error as to the
prohibition (direkter Verbotsirrtum); and (b) an indirect error as to the prohi-
bition (indirekter Verbotsirrtum).182 The former describes the situation that
either the offender does not know the criminal law provision prohibiting the act
or that he misinterprets the criminal law provision and believes that it does not
apply.183
An indirect error as to the prohibition is given, if the offender erroneously
believes that his conduct is justiﬁed under certain legal provisions (i.e. self-
defence). In this case, the offender either assumes a legal provision excluding
liability which does not exist (is not recognized in criminal law) or he misin-
terprets a ground of excluding criminal liability which does exist but does not
apply in the given situation.
2. An error as to the prohibition may exclude the culpability (Schuld)
According to § 17, it is necessary that the mistake as to the prohibition could
not have been avoided. Therefore, errors as to the prohibition have to be fur-
ther examined as to their avoidability. The law proceeds on the assumption that,
if the error as to the prohibition could not have been avoided by the offender,
the offender cannot be blamed for his conduct which he believed was lawful.
Since the issue of blameworthiness is a matter of the “third stage” according
to the three-stage-structure of the offence in German criminal law, an unavoid-
able error as to the prohibition excludes the culpability. To the contrary, if 
the offender could have avoided the error as to the prohibition, he is to be
blamed for his unlawful conduct. Therefore, according to § 17 s. 2 dStGB cul-
pability is not excluded. However, mitigation of punishment is possible. The
punishment may be mitigated because the offender, though acting against the
law despite the avoidability of his erroneous belief, at least he did not con-
sciously infringe the law. Therefore it could be justiﬁed in some cases, to give
weight to the fact that the offender believed that he was acting in accordance
with the law.
Hence, errors as to the prohibition might be categorized into two different
categories, namely: avoidable errors; and unavoidable errors. The exact
deﬁnition of the avoidability is still subject to some dispute in German crimi-
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188 Ebke & Finkin, Introduction to German Law, supra note 53, at 396.
189 Federal German Criminal Court, BGHSt 39, 35 quoted in Neuner, ‘General Principles of
International Criminal Law in Germany, supra note 161, at 122–23.
nal law. The Courts apply a very strict standard as to the avoidability of the
error as to the prohibition.184
The BGH ruled in a decision that every person must examine whether his
conduct conforms to the requirements of law. The court went on asserting that
one must “exert one’s conscience”.185 In case there are uncertainties as to the
lawfulness, a duty rests upon every person to make inquiries about the law-
fulness or unlawfulness. This implies that a person not familiar with the law
must seek for legal advice. It is not sufﬁcient to rely on one’s own doubtful
interpretation of the law.186 Even though wrong legal advice does not exoner-
ate the offender as such; wrong legal advice is only relevant if the advisor was
reliable and could guarantee impartial responsible legal advice.187
Due to the strict standard applied by the courts, an error as to the prohibition
of law is in most cases avoidable. This is because the offender in most cases
could have consulted a legal expert in order to enhance his knowledge about
the law.188 Hence, § 17 dStGB de facto hardly ever occurs as a ground for
excluding the culpability.
Most notably, the Federal German Criminal Court ruled twice on the con-
cept of Verbotsirrtum in cases involving international criminal law. In the ﬁrst
case the Court convicted the East German border patrols of the killing of civil-
ians ﬂeeing to West Germany at the former border between East and West
Germany. In this case the Court denied that it was unavoidable that East
German border guards believed in the legality of the order to shoot. The Court
was of the opinion that such orders to kill which affect the “the life as the high-
est legal interest” and “which would be contrary to humanity need not be com-
plied with”. The Court held that the fact the border patrols acted with regard
to the order to shoot was an avoidable Verbotsirrtum.189 In the second case,
however, the Court acquitted East German ofﬁcials who had granted West
German terrorists a permanent refuge in the former East Germany. The Court
held that it could not be ruled out that the East German ofﬁcials had acted 
in an unavoidable Verbotsirrtum, because of the “difﬁcult legal situation,
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190 Federal German Criminal Court, BGHSt 44, 52 (60) quoted in Neuner, ‘General Principles
of International Criminal Law in Germany, supra note 161, at 122.
191 This is the ﬁrst judgment in which the BGHSt acknowledged an unavoidable Verbotirrtum
in the ﬁeld of international criminal law with the result that the perpetrators were acquitted.
192 Mathias Neuner, General Principles of International Criminal Law in Germany, supra note
161, at 122.
which would be dominated by scarcely outlined principles of international
law”.190 The reason that the error was considered to be unavoidable was that the
judges could not require that state ofﬁcials in East Germany should have been
aware about the laws on obstruction of justice in West Germany.191 The above
quoted cases demonstrate that the German legal system continues to follow a
differentiated approach with regard to mistakes of law in upholding the prin-
ciple of guilt.192
General remarks
The present study evidence the inconsistency which shadows the jurisprudence
of both ad hoc Tribunals with regard to the mens rea required for triggering the
criminal responsibility of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Evidently, judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers coming from different
schools of law and joining the ICTY and ICTR have made numerous efforts in
order to reach a deﬁnitive concept for mens rea in international criminal law,
however, more frequently, a breakdown in communication occurs between dif-
ferent legal cultures. Moreover, the case law of the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Tribunals lacks the consistency in establishing the constituent mens rea
required for different modes of participation in a criminal offence. Hence, and
for the sake of international criminal justice, a tendency towards a better
understanding of the mens rea concept in different legal systems is a must. This
could not be achieved without an in depth and a systematic study of mens rea
standards in comparative law. The starting point of this comparative study
focused on the concept of intention in German criminal law, as a unique sys-
tem enriched by enormous theories on the matter. German criminal law has an
elaborate and highly reﬁned system of describing and analysing the general
structure of criminal offences. In German criminal system, the state of mind of
the defendant has to be evaluated at two stages, Tatbestand and Schuld. One
of the main features of the German criminal law is that it distinguishes sharply
between intention in the broad sense and negligence. The latter does not carry
criminal responsibility unless a particular crime provides for its punishment.
Criminal negligence is deﬁned as conscious or unconsciousness deviation
from the required standard of care which causes a result prohibited by crimi-
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nal law. Yet, in German criminal law the mens rea qualifying for criminal
responsibility is thus only that of intention in the broad sense. This intention
covers all situations in which the actor acts both with “will” and “knowledge”
of the underlying facts. This intention covers different sub-concepts, namely:
dolus directus of ﬁrst degree; dolus indirectus; and dolus eventualis. In German
criminal law the volitional element denotes the borderline between dolus
eventualis and advertent or conscious negligence. That is to say, mere 
knowledge is not sufﬁcient to hold a person criminally liable for intentional
crimes provided for in the dStGB. This was the view adopted by the Appeals
Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal, where it emphasised that both “an aware-
ness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element must be incorporated
in the legal standard.”193 To put differently, intent must encompass both 
an intellectual element and volitional element, however low this volitional 
element might be.
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal relied on the
German “theory of consent and approval”194 stating that “a person who orders
an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a
crime will be committed in the execution of that order, has the requisite mens
rea for establishing liability under Article 7(1) pursuant to ordering. Ordering
with such awareness has to be regarded as accepting that crime.”195
Section V of the present study was an attempt to shed light on the distinc-
tion between mistake of law and mistake of fact and whether or not these mis-
take may negate the mental element of the offence in question. As already
mentioned, German criminal law recognises two types of mistakes which are
considered to be grounds of excluding criminal responsibility, namely: mistake
of fact; and mistake of law. The former as they correspond to the legal elements
of the crime in question may exclude the criminal intent, whereas the latter may
constitute a ground of excluding culpability (Schuldausschließungsgrund).
Hence, the German criminal law grants the actor a larger degree of beneﬁt for
the subjective contingencies which may have obscured his awareness of act-
ing against the law.196
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197 Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist Conception
of International Criminal Law’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 13; Michael
Bohlander & Mark Findlay, ‘The Use of Domestic Sources as a Basis for International Criminal
Law’, 2 The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence (2002) 1;
Michael Bohlander, ‘The Inﬂuence of Academic Research on the Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – A First Overview’, 3 The Global
Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence (2003) 195. The second survey
on the subject will address the Mens rea concept in Islamic Law Sharia’a.
To conclude, many provisions provided for in the Statutes of the ICTY,
ICTR and the ICC are the result of compromises between different legal sys-
tems and cultures, and are therefore questionable, when strictly evaluated
from a legal point of view. This holds particularly true with regard to the lack
of differentiation between various standards of mens rea in international crim-
inal law. Hence, more comparative surveys should be undertaken with regard
to the establishment of a uniﬁed concept for mens rea in international crimi-
nal law.197
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